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IRS Summary Assessment Powers: 
Abuse and Control 
The jeopardy and termination assessment powers of the In- 
ternal Revenue Service, shielded by the anti-injunction provision 
of the Code, give the IRS virtually unfettered power to seize all 
of a taxpayer's assets in satisfaction of an alleged tax liability. 
This comment will examine the current statutory scheme provid- 
ing for these summary assessment powers, including existing tax- 
payer remedies, and reevaluate the constitutionality of summary 
assessment procedures. Recent abuses of the powers will be re- 
viewed, followed by a discussion of alternative methods of con- 
trolling them. Finally, the most recent attempt a t  control, the 
1975 summary assessment reform bill, will be considered in some 
detail. 
A. Assessment Procedures 
1. Normal assessment procedures 
Under normal IRS assessment and collection procedures, a 
taxpayer has ample notice that the Commissoner proposes to 
assess and collect additional taxes from him. In fact, after infor- 
mally notifying the taxpayer that more tax is owed, the IRS will 
usually attempt to negotiate a settlement with him.2 If settlement 
negotiations reach an impasse, the district director3 will issue a 
statutory notice of deficiency, or "90-day letter,"' informing the 
taxpayer of the amount of the deficiency the director intends to 
formally assess and collect. The director is prohibited from pro- 
ceeding further with the assessment or collection of the tax until 
1. The normal IRS procedures for assessment of taxes deemed owing the federal 
government are found in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 9 9  6211-15. The general provisions on 
collection are found in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 4 9  6301-03, and the provisions on seizure 
of property for the collection of taxes are found in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $ 3  6331-43. 
2. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, for example, a total of 2,187,864 returns 
were examined by the audit division of the IRS, which proposed additional taxes and 
penalties amounting to $5,909,198. Of these, only 8,799 cases resulted in petitions to the 
Tax Court, and only 1,133 produced refund suits in the district courts and the Court of 
Claims. 1974 COMM'R OF INT. REV. ANN. REP. 39-41, 102-03. 
3. While most of the Code provisions specify that the action required by them shall 
be taken by "the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate," as a practical matter, most 
such functions are carried out by "his delegate," the local district director of the Internal 
Revenue Service. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 9 9 301.6861-1 (a) (1961), 301.6851-1 (az (1959). 
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 9 6213(a). 
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the end of the 90-day period following notificati~n.~ During the 
90-day period the taxpayer may: (1) accept the deficiency and 
pay the tax, (2) pay the tax and sue for a refund in a United 
States district court,R or (3) before paying any of the tax, petition 
the Tax Court for a redetermination of the alleged deficiency.' By 
petitioning the Tax Court, the taxpayer further forestalls IRS 
collection activities until the decision of the Tax Court becomes 
final? Only after expiration of the 90-day period, and conclusion 
of Tax Court litigation and appeals therefrom, may the IRS make 
its assessment and formal demand for p a ~ m e n t . ~  The taxpayer is 
then given a 10-day grace period before the IRS can levy on his 
property. In 
5. Id. Any attempt by the district director to assess or collect the alleged deficiency 
during the 90-day period may be enjoined, notwithstanding the anti-injunction provisions 
of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 6 7421(a), by a proceeding in the proper court. Butler v. District 
Director of Internal Revenue, 369 F. Supp. 1281,1282 (S.D. Tex. 1973). See Walker v. IRS, 
333 F.2d 768, 770 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U S .  926 (1965); Sturgeon v. Schuster, 
158 F.2d 811, 813 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 817 (1947). 
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $6 6532, 7422. See notes 71-80 and accompanying text 
infra. 
7. The 90-day letter is in fact a jurisdictional prerequisite to litigation in the Tax 
Court, and as such has been termed the taxpayer's "ticket" to the Tax Court. Corbett v. 
Frank, 293 F.2d 501, 502 (9th Cir. 1961). 
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 6 6213(a) provides in pertinent part: 
Except as otherwise provided in section 6861 [the jeopardy assessment provi- 
son] no assessment of a deficiency in respect of any tax imposed by subtitle A 
or B or chapter 42 or 43 and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall 
be made, begun, or prosecuted until such notice [the 90-day letter] has been 
mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such 90-day . . . period, . . . 
nor, if a petition has been filed with the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax 
Court has become final. 
9. Id. Assessment gives rise to a lien on "all property and rights to property, whether 
real or personal" of the taxpayer. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 6 6321. 
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 6 6331(a) provides in pertinent part: 
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 
10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary or his 
delegate to collect the tax . . . by levy . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 6 6334(a) lists the property exempt from 
levy: 
(1) Wearing apparel and school books. 
Such items of wearing apparel and such school books as are necessary for 
the taxpayer or for members of his family; 
(2) Fuel, provisions, furniture, and personal effects. 
If the taxpayer is the head of a family, so much of the fuel, provisions, 
furniture, and personal effects in his household, and of the arms for personal use, 
livestock, and poultry of the taxpayer, as does not exceed $500 in value; 
(3) Books and tools of a trade, business, or profession. 
So many of the books and tools necessary for the trade, business, or profes- 
sion of the taxpayer as do not exceed in the aggregate $250 in value. 
IRS SUMMARY ASSESSMENT POWERS 
Under special circumstances, however, the IRS is empowered 
to bypass these normal procedures for notice and prepayment 
hearing, moving immediately to assessment, demand for pay- 
ment, and collection by seizure of the taxpayer's assets. These 
summary procedures are of two basic types: jeopardy assess- 
ments" and termination assessments.12 
(4) Unemployment benefits. 
Any amount payable to an individual with respect to his unemployment 
(including any portion thereof payable with respect to dependents) under an 
unemployment compensation law of the United States, of any State, or of the 
District of Columbia or of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(5) Undelivered mail. 
Mail, addressed to any person, which has not been delivered to  the addres- 
see. 
(6) Certain annuity and pension payments. 
Annuity or pension payments under the Railroad Retirement Act, benefits 
under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, special pension payments 
received by a person whose name has been entered on the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, and Coast Guard Medal of Honor Roll (38 U.S.C. 562), and annuities 
based on retired or retainer pay under chapter 73 of title 10 of the United States 
Code. 
(7) Workmen's compensation. 
Any amount payable to an individual as workmen's compensation (includ- 
ing any portion thereof payable with respect to dependents) under a workmen's 
compensation law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(8) Salary, wages, or other income. 
If the taxpayer is required by judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, 
entered prior to the date of levy, to contribute to the support of his minor 
children, so much of his salary, wages, or other income as is necessary to comply 
with such judgment. 
As stated a t  7 RESEARCH INSTITUTE TAX COORDINATOR 1 V-5201: 
Except for the above enumerated exceptions, no property is exempt from 
levy. 
This means that no provision of state law may exempt property or rights 
to property from levy for the collection of any federal tax. 
The mere fact that certain property is exempt from levy and execution 
under state law does not mean that it is exempt from federal levy. 
For instance, property exempt from execution under state personal or 
homestead exemption law is, nevertheless, subject to levy by the United States 
for collection of its taxes. And property of a deceased taxpayer set aside for a 
year's support of widow and minor children under state law . . . also has been 
held to be subject to levy. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6861 (jeopardy assessment of income, estate, gift, and 
certain excise taxes), 6862 (jeopardy assessment of all other taxes). See generally Hoch- 
man & Tack, Jeopardy Assessments-A System in Jeopardy, 45 TAXES 418 (1967); Note, 
Jeopardy Assessment: The Sovereign's Stranglehold, 55 GEO. L.J. 701 (1967) [hereinafter 
cited as Stranglehold]. 
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6851. Seegenerally Peale, Termination of Taxable Year, 
52 TAXES 305 (1974); Comment, Code Section 6851-"Termination of Taxable 
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2. The jeopardy assessment power 
Under sections 686113 (income, estate, gift, and certain excise 
taxes) and 686214 (all other taxes) of the 1954 Code, if the district 
director "believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency 
. . . will be jeopardized by delay, he shall . . . immediately as- 
sess" and collect the deficiency.15 A jeopardy assessment is only 
appropriate after expiration of the taxpayer's tax period and the 
determination of a deficiency? 
By invoking the jeopardy assessment power, the IRS may 
make an immediate assessment and demand for payment, with- 
out prior notice to the taxpayer." Typically, the taxpayer is un- 
able to immediately tender payment of the full jeopardy assess- 
ment. Furthermore, because the jeopardy assessment power is 
Year9'-Application and Function Within the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 9 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 381 (1973); Note, Termination of Taxable Year: Procedures in Jeopardy, 
26 TAX L. REV. 829 (1971); Note, Termination of Taxable Years: The Quagmire of Internal 
Revenue Code Section 6851, 15 W M .  & MARY L. REV. 658 (1974). 
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 6861(a) provides: 
(a) Authority for Making. 
If the Secretary or his delegate believes that the assessment or collection of 
a deficiency, as defined in section 6211, will be jeopardized by delay, he shall, 
notwithstanding the provisions of section 6213(a), immediately assess such defi- 
ciency (together with all interest, additional amounts, and additions to the tax 
provided for by law), and notice and demand shall be made by the Secretary or 
his delegate for the payment thereof. 
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, Q 6862(a) states the essence of the jeopardy assessment 
power: 
(a) Immediate Assessment. 
If the Secretary or his delegate believes that the collection of any tax (other 
than income tax, estate tax, and gift tax) under any provision of the internal 
revenue laws will be jeopardized by delay, he shall, whether or not the time 
otherwise prescribed by law for making return and paying such tax has expired, 
immediately assess such tax (together with all interest, additional amounts, and 
additions to the tax provided for by law). Such tax, additions to the tax, and 
interest shall thereupon become immediately due and payable, and immediate 
notice and demand shall be made by the Secretary or his delegate for the 
payment thereof. 
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, Q 6861(a); see note 13 supra. 
16. Note that § 6861(a) (income, estate, gift, and certain excise taxes), quoted in full 
in note 13 supra, applies only to the summary collection of a deficiency. INT. REV. CODE 
OF 1954, § 6861(a). The IRS had interpreted this to mean an amount owing after the 
taxpayer's tax year or quarter had ended. See, e.g. ,  Laing v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 473, 
476, 480 (1976) (argument of IRS). Laing v .  United States nevertheless held that the 
assessment authority of Q 6861 is necessarily referred to by 8 6851 (termination of taxable 
year). Section 6862, on the other hand, specifically states that it is applicable to the 
collection of any tax (other than income, estate, and gift taxes), "whether or not the time 
otherwise prescribed by law for making return and paying such tax has expired . . . ." 
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 6861. 
2331 IRS SUMMARY ASSESSMENT POWERS 237 
necessary in situations in which delay may endanger the collec- 
tion of the revenue,IR the 10-day grace period prior to levy does 
not apply, l 9  and assessment, demand for payment, and seizure2" 
of the taxpayer's property in satisfaction of the assessment can 
be virtually s imul tane~us .~~  The ultimate effect on the taxpayer 
may be disastrous, rendering him i rnpecun io~s~~  and often perma- 
nently ruining his business .23 
The statutory notice of deficiency, or 90-day letter, which 
ordinarily precedes and forestalls assessment and collection, is 
still required in the jeopardy assessment context, but need only 
be sentz4 within 60 days after the jeopardy assessment has been 
made? While failure to send the 90-day letter within 60 days 
18. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 6861(a) expressly provides that "[ilf the Secretary or 
his delegate believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency . . . will be jeopard- 
ized by delay" a jeopardy assessment should be made. (Emphasis added.) 
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $ 6331(a) provides: 
If the Secretary or his delegate makes a finding that the collection of such tax 
is in jeopardy, notice and demand for immediate payment of such tax may be 
made by the Secretary or his delegate and, upon failure or refusal to pay such 
tax, collection thereof by levy shall be lawful without regard to the 10-day period 
provided in this section. 
20. Failure or refusal to pay the tax as assessed and demanded gives rise to a federal 
tax lien under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $ 6321: 
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after 
demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to 
tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition 
thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights 
to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person. 
The Internal Revenue Manual provides, in its instructions to agents, that 
[i]f . . . it is determined that the filing of the notices of Federal tax lien will 
not provide the degree of protection necessary to ensure that the taxpayer will 
not dispose of, dissipate or secrete certain types of personal property, action 
should be initiated to levy upon such assets. 
CCH INT. REV. MANUAL $ 5213.24(1) (1974). The provisions on levy and sale of taxpayer 
property for the collection of taxes are found in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $ $  6331-44. 
21. The district director for Arizona is quoted as giving the following instructions to  
his field personnel: 
When we are in possession of facts which warrant such action . . . procedures 
will be developed so that [summary assessments] can be made in less than two 
hours. . . . Emergency situations may be handled orally and covered thereafter 
by written reports. 
Silver, Terminating the taxpayer's taxable year: How IRS uses it against narcotics 
suspects, 40 J .  TAXATION 110 (1974). 
22. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Patterson, 242 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1957). 
23. See, e.g., Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901, 902 (S.D. Fla. 1957). 
24. The statutory notice of deficiency must be sent by certified or registered mail. 
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $ 6212(a). 
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $ 6861(b). 
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renders the jeopardy assessment invalid and therefore subject to 
injunction," this remedy does little to protect the hapless tax- 
payer, since the IRS can make successive jeopardy assessments 
until the statute of limitations has run?' Further, the Commis- 
sioner will not be estopped from later changing the amount of the 
deficiency originally claimed in the 90-day letter? Hence, the 
only real value of the 90-day letter to the taxpayer is its function 
as the prerequisite to litigation in the Tax Court.29 
During the 90-day period, the IRS holds the taxpayer's seized 
property. The property may be sold after the statutory notice of 
deficiency has been issued and the taxpayer's 90-day period for 
filing his petition in the Tax Court has expired. If the taxpayer 
does timely petition the Tax Court, sale of the seized property is 
stayed pending the outcome of the Tax Court proceeding and any 
appeals therefr~m.~" 
3. Termination assessments 
As mentioned earlier, the jeopardy assessment power may 
only be exercised after the normal expiration of the taxable year.31 
Occasionally, however, the Service discovers that collection of the 
current year's tax will be jeopardized by waiting until the end of 
the year. Hence, section 6851 provides that the Service must 
immediately declare the taxpayer's taxable year terminated and 
determine his tax liability for the shorter period, 
[i]f the Secretary or his delegate finds that a taxpayer 
designs quickly to depart from the United States or to remove 
-- -- 
26. United States v. Lehigh, 201 F. Supp. 224, 228 (W.D. Ark. 1961); Berry v. Wes- 
tover, 70 F. Supp. 537, 546 (S.D. Cal. 1947); Dinwiddie Lampton, 17 B.T.A. 649, 652 
(1929); G.H. Connell, 15 B.T.A. 1309 (1929); J.H. Reese, 15 B.T.A. 1261 (1929). See 
United States v. Ball, 326 F.2d 898, 901 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v. Martin, 395 F. 
Supp. 954, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Ahrens, 394 F. Supp. 531, 540 (W.D. 
Ark. 1975). 
27. Berry v. Westover, 70 F. Supp. 537, 546 (S.D. Cal. 1947); W. Cleve Stokes, 22 
T.C. 415, 422-23 (1954). 
28. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6861(c) expressly provides: 
The jeopardy assessment may be made in respect of a deficiency greater or less 
than that notice of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, despite the provisions 
of section 6212 (c) prohibiting the determination of additional deficiencies, and 
whether or not the taxpayer has theretofore filed a petition with the Tax Court. 
29. See note 7 supra. 
30. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6863(b)(3)(A). Notwithstanding this stay, the seized 
property may be sold if the taxpayer consents to the sale or if the property is perishable 
or unduly expensive to maintain. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6863(b)(3)(B). 
31. Note 16 and accompanying text supra. 
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his property therefrom, or to conceal himself or his property 
therein, or to do any other act tending to prejudice or to render 
wholly or partially ineffectual proceedings to collect the income 
tax for the current or the preceding taxable year unless such 
proceedings be brought without delay . . . . 32 
The tax computed becomes immediately due and payable, just 
as if the taxable year had come to a normal close, and the Service 
must demand immediate payment.33 As in the case of jeopardy 
assessments, the taxpayer is purposely taken by surprise and gen- 
erally cannot immediately tender the amount assessed. There- 
fore, in most cases, the Service exercises its power to seize his 
property in satisfaction of the termination a s s e ~ s m e n t . ~ ~  
Until recently, a termination assessment was thought to be 
considerably more onerous than a jeopardy assessment because 
the IRS asserted that section 6861, which requires issuance of a 
90-day letter within 60 days of a jeopardy assessment, did not 
apply to termination  assessment^.^^ Hence, a t  the earliest, the 
IRS would send a 90-day letter to the taxpayer a t  the end of his 
taxable year,36 but could conceivably wait until the three-year 
statute of limitations had run following the close of his taxable 
year.37 
The Commissioner's interpretation was recently invalidated 
32. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, # 6851(a)(l). 
33. Id. 
34. The IRS draws its authority to immediately levy on the property of a termination- 
assessed or jeopardy-assessed taxpayer from the same source: INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 
6331(a), quoted in pertinent part in note 19 supra. As with a jeopardy assessment, a 
termination assessment involves a "finding that the collecton of .  . . tax is in jeopardy," 
and the 10-day grace period for payment does not apply. Id. 
35. Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 473 (1976); 
Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973); Williamson v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax 
R.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1971). Contra, Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1974); Rambo 
v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 886 (1976). See note 
16 supra. 
As discussed in note 7 supra, the 90-day letter is a prerequisite to Tax Court jurisdic- 
tion. Thus, as long as the IRS delays sending the 90-day letter, the taxpayer is barred from 
petitioning the Tax Court. 
36. The final tax liability cannot actually be determined until the end of the tax- 
payer's taxable year. Because either the taxpayer or the IRS can reopen the question of 
liability a t  any time until the end of the year, any mid-year "deficiency" is effectively 
meaningless. 
37. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 4 6501(a) provides that the Service must make its assess- 
ment within three years of the date the return is filed for the full year. This gives the IRS 
three years in which to complete its audit. Note, Termination of Taxable Years: The 
Quagmire of Internal Revenue Code Section 6851, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 658, 661 n.19 
(1974). For further discussion of the problems confronting a termination-assessed taxpayer 
see Note, Section 6851 Termination of A Taxable Year: The Search for A Taxpayer 
Remedy, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 683 (1975). 
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by the Supreme Court in Laing v. United States,38 where it was 
held that termination of a tax year gives rise to a deficiency and 
that any subsequent summary assessment must be made pur- 
suant to section 6861 jeopardy assessment  procedure^.^^ Thus, it 
is now clear that the 90-day letter must be sent within 60 days 
after a jeopardy assessment following either termination or nor- 
mal expiration of a taxable year.40 
B. Summary  Assessment and the  Constitution 
1. T h e  Phillips doctrine 
Jeopardy and termination assessments clearly involve a dep- 
rivation of property without the prior notice and hearing ordinar- 
ily required by the C o n s t i t ~ t i o n . ~ ~  The Supreme Court, however, 
has consistently sustained the use of these summary powers, cit- 
ing the taxpayer's right to either petition the Tax Court for a 
subsequent redetermination of his tax liability or pay the tax and 
sue for a refund as satisfying due process requirements. Decisions 
upholding the summary powers generally rely on the Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Phillips u. Commissioner," which upheld the 
constitutionality of an early version of the jeopardy assessment 
power.43 In Phillips the Court recognized the superiority of the 
sovereign's right to collect the revenues over an individual's right 
to notice and a hearing prior to seizure of his property, and con- 
cluded that "[wlhere, as here, adequate opportunity is afforded 
for a later judicial determination of the legal rights, summary 
proceedings to secure prompt performance of pecuniary obliga- 
38. 96 S. Ct. 473 (1976). 
39. Id. a t  485. 
40. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 6861(b). 
41. See notes 46-51 and accompanying text infra. The Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . ." 
In addition to the due process issue, the taxpayer whose entire assets have been seized 
may find himself deprived of effective representation because of his inability to hire 
counsel. Stranglehold, supra note 11, a t  731. 
This problem may even reach Sixth Amendment proportions in cases in which crimi- 
nal penalties may be imposed, Stranglehold, supra note 11, a t  731-32 & nn.196-200, or in 
which subsequent criminal prosecutions may be affected by the outcome of the civil tax 
proceeding, id. at  732. 
Under certain circumstances, the jeopardy-assessed taxpayer may also require, but 
be unable to afford, the services of a qualified accountant. See Comment, Taxpayer's 
Constitutional Right to an  Accountant in a Net Worth Prosecution After Being Rendered 
lndigent by a Jeopardy Assessment, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 808 (1958). 
42. 283 U.S. 589 (1931). 
43. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§  279, 280(a)(l), 44 Stat. 9, 61. 
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tion to the government have been consistently ~ u s t a i n e d . " ~ ~  Since 
Phillips, the few suits which have attacked the jeopardy assess- 
ment power on constitutional grounds have been uniformly un- 
S U C C ~ S S ~ U ~ . ~ ~  
Recently, some taxpayers have challenged the summary as- 
sessment powers on the authority of a new series of Supreme 
Court cases dealing with the constitutionality of creditors' pre- 
judgment attachment and garnishment remedies.46 Upon reex- 
amining traditional notions of procedural due process, the Court 
announced in Sniadach v. Family Finance Gorp." and Fuentes u. 
S h e ~ i n ~ ~  that, except in a few extraordinary circumstances involv- 
ing important governmental interests,4g state-authorized prejudg- 
ment seizure of significant property interests must be preceded 
by notice and opportunity for a hearing.50 Unfortunately for 
jeopardy- and termination-assessed taxpayers, the Court in 
Fuentes identified as one of those extraordinary circumstances 
44. 283 U S .  a t  595. The Court further held that "[wlhere only property rights are 
involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the 
opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate." Id. 
a t  596-97. The Court then suggested two alternative methods of judicial review: (1) refund 
litigation or (2) redetermination of liability by the Board of Tax Appeals. Id. a t  597-98. 
45. See, e.g., Continental Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 434, 435-36 (1st Cir. 
1933); Communist Party of United States v. Moysey, 141 F. Supp. 332, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 
1956). 
46. See, e.g., Matthews v. United States, 74-1 U.S. TAX CAS. fi 9346 (S.D. Tex. 1974). 
See also McGee v. United States, 380 F. Supp. 801,804 (N.D. Ind. 1974); Preble v. United 
States, 376 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (D. Mass. 1974); Commonwealth Dev. Ass'n v. United 
States, 365 F. Supp. 792, 796 (M.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1398 (3rd Cir. 1974). 
47. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
48. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
49. Id. a t  90-92; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U S .  337, 339 (1969). The 
Court stated in Fuentes: 
There are "extraordinary situations" that justify postponing notice and 
opportunity for a hearing. These situations, however, must be truly unusual. 
Only in a few limited situations has this Court allowed outright seizure without 
opportunity for a prior hearing. First, in each case, the seizure has been directly 
necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Sec- 
ond, there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has 
kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating 
the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under 
the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified 
in the particular instance. 
407 U S .  a t  90-91 (citations omitted). Given the broad discretion granted to the district 
director, and the failure to provide adequate standards to circumscribe his exercise of that  
discretion, the statutory provisions governing summary assessments do not appear to be 
"narrowly drawn." 
50. 407 U S .  a t  90-91; 395 U.S. at 339. See Note, Procedural Due Process-The Prior 
Hearing Rule and the Demise of Ex Parte Remedies, 53 BOST. U.L. REV. 41 (1973). 
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involving important governmental interests, the "summary sei- 
zure of property to collect the internal revenue of the United 
States . . . ," citing, and implicitly reaffirming, P h i l l i p ~ . ~ ~  
2. A second look a t  Phillips 
As noted earlier, the Phillips rationale, which subsequent 
decisions have uniformly cited as con t r~ l l ing ,~~  is that the oppor- 
tunity for a post-seizure judicial redetermination of tax liability 
affords a jeopardy-assessed taxpayer adequate due process pro- 
tection." There is, however, a critical weakness in this rationale. 
The Tax Court's (or in the case of a refund suit, the district 
court's or Court of Claims') review of a summary assessment is 
no different from its review of a normal assessment; that is, the 
court reviews only the amount of the tax liability, and does not 
consider whether or not jeopardy actually existed." Indeed, 
courts have held that the district director's jeopardy determina- 
tion is generally n~nreviewable.~~ Also, in the case of termination 
assessments, the statute expressly declares the director's deter- 
mination to be presumptively correct." Thus, the taxpayer who, 
as a result of a jeopardy assessment, has been improverished 
overnight and often has had his business permanently ruined, is 
unable to obtain any judicial review of the jeopardy determina- 
tion which was originally responsible for his hardship. Seen in 
this light, the Supreme Court's satisfaction in Phillips with the 
availability of judicial review of tax liability seems shortsighted. 
In his recent concurring opinion in Laing v. United States, Mr. 
Justice Brennan concluded with regard to the termination assess- 
ment provision: 
- 
51. 407 U S .  a t  91-92. 
52. See cases cited note 45 supra. 
53. Note 44 and accompanying text supra. 
54. Stranglehold, supra note 11, a t  723. 
55. See, e.g., Iannelli v. Long, 487 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1973); Transport Mfg. & 
Equip. Co. v. Trainor, 382 F.2d 793, 799 (8th Cir. 1967); Ginsburg v. United States, 278 
F.2d 470, 472-73 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U S .  878 (1960); Lloyd v. Patterson, 242 F.2d 
742, 743-44 (5th Cir. 1957); Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F.2d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 1957); 
Williams v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 71, 75 (D. Nev. 1973). See also Kaminsky, 
Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Jeopardy Assessments Under the Internal 
Revenue Code, 14 TAX L. REV. 545 (1959). 
56. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, Q 6851(a)(1) provides in pertinent part: 
In any proceeding in court brought to enforce payment of taxes made due and 
payable by virtue of the provisions of this section, the finding of the Secretary 
or his delegate, made as herein provided, whether made after notice to the 
taxpayer or not, shall be for all purposes presumptive evidence of jeopardy. 
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[It] falls short in my view, of meeting due process require- 
ments. . . . 
. . . .  
. . . However expeditiously the Tax Court handles [a] 
claim, that court is not required to decide the merits within any 
specified time, and no provision is made for a prompt prelimi- 
nary evaluation of the basis for the asse~sment.~' 
C. Remedies Presently Auaila ble 
The Code presently affords several avenues for the jeopardy- 
assessed taxpayer to obtain a final determination of his tax liabil- 
ity and secure the return of his property. Close examination, how- 
ever, reveals serious weaknesses in each of them. 
1.  Posting bond 
By posting a bond with the district director equal to the 
amount of the asses~ment ,~~ a taxpayer can stay all action to 
collect a jeopardy assessment until the decision of the Tax Court 
becomes final." Unless the taxpayer is quick enough to file the 
bond before his property is actually levied upon, the bond may 
be filed only with the consent of the district director." Thus, since 
the Code allows the district director to levy immediately after the 
assessment and simultaneously demand full p a ~ m e n t , ~ '  this rem- 
edy is normally only available to the jeopardy-assessed taxpayer 
at the pleasure of the district director. 
Even if the taxpayer is permitted to post a bond, as a practi- 
57. 96 S. Ct. 473, 487 (1976). 
58. Under the 1939 Code, the Commissioner could require that the bond be double 
the amount of the assessed deficiency. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 273(f), 53 Stat. 
85. 
59. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $ 6863(a) (jeopardy assessment); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 6851(e) (termination assessment). 
The decision of the Tax Court does not become final if either the taxpayer or the 
Commissioner files a petition for review in the court of appeals within three months, or 
while appeal is pending. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $8 7481, 7483. 
60. As required by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $ 0  6851(e), 6863(a), regulations have been 
promulgated governing the filing of such bonds. For example, Treas. Reg. § 301.6863- 
l(a)(2) (1958) provides that a bond may be filed: 
(i) At any time before the time collection by levy is authorized under 
section 6331(a), or 
(ii) After collection by levy is authorized and before levy is made on any 
property or rights to property, or 
(iii) In the discretion of the district director, after any such levy has been 
made and before the expiration of the period of limitations on collection. 
61. The normal 10-day waiting period is inapplicable. Note 19 supra. 
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cal matter one may not be commercially available. Bonding com- 
panies generally require that a taxpayer have total assets sub- 
stantially in excess of the amount assessed.62 Most jeopardy- 
assessed taxpayers, however, cannot meet this req~irement.'~ In
addition, if the taxpayer's assets have already been distrained, he 
may be unable even to pay the cost of the bond.64 This situation 
is improved only slightly by a case in which a district director was 
required to allow financially qualified friends of the taxpayer to 
act as sureties in lieu of the bond,65 since few taxpayers are fortun- 
ate enough to have such friends. 
Moreover, even the taxpayer who is permitted to post a bond, 
and who finds one commercially available, may discover that 
obtaining a bond has the same net effect as the levy itself. Often, 
especially for a release bond, liquid collateral must be posted with 
the bonding company. Thus, it is likely that the same property 
the IRS levied on, or an equal amount of cash will then be im- 
pounded as security for the bond, and the taxpayer will still be 
unable to use his property.66 
2. Voluntary abatement by the Service 
Because the Service was originally of the belief that it had 
no authority to revoke even a clearly mistaken jeopardy 
as~essment,'~ Congress added a provision permitting total abate- 
ment of a jeopardy assessment if the Service later determines that 
62. Gould, Jeopardy Assessments, When They May be Levied and What to Do about 
Them. N.Y .U. 1 8 ~ ~  INST. ON FED. TAX. 937, 944-45 (1960). 
63. One author suggests that "[jleopardy assessments are most often levied upon 
those whose assets allegedly do not cover their liabilities . . . ." Stranglehold, supra note 
11, a t  727. 
64. This has led a t  least one court to label the bond remedy a "mockery": 
In the instant case every bit of property (inclusive of bank accounts) of both 
taxpayers (and their wives) has been seized: it would seem to be mere mockery 
to say they, after they have been stripped of all assets, are protected in that they 
may either post a bond or pay the three hundred odd thousand dollars of taxes 
and penalties assessed in order to stay the waste of a forced sale of their assets 
and the certain destruction of their business. 
Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901, 902 (S.D. Fla. 1957) (emphasis in original). 
65. Yoke v. Mazzello, 202 F.2d 508, 510 (4th Cir. 1953). It  had been the policy of that 
district office to accept only the surety bond of an approved bonding company or a deposit 
of personal property. In Yoke, the district collector was held to have abused his discretion 
by refusing to accept an offer by two friends of the taxpayer to act as sureties, where the 
two friends owned unencumbered real estate worth more than two times the amount of 
the assessment. Id. 
66. See Alexander, Wrongful Attachment Damages Must Be Fixed in the Original 
Suit, 4 U .  SAN FRAN. L. REV. 38, 40 (1960). 
67. S. REP. NO. 730, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1953). 
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jeopardy does not exist? Further, a treasury regulation allows 
partial abatement when jeopardy does exist but the assessment 
is excess i~e .~~ Nevertheless, since the Code provision and treasury 
regulation do not contain formal procedural requirements for the 
handling of abatement requests, the outcome is still subject to the 
discretion of the same district director who made the original 
jeopardy determination and approved the asse~sment .~~  Since, in 
most cases, the district director will be reluctant to admit his 
error, this remedy is virtually useless to the jeopardy-assessed 
taxpayer. Since Laing, this same provision for abatement appears 
to be available (though equally useless) to the taxpayer whose 
jeopardy assessment follows termination of his taxable year. 
3. Refund litigation 
Another remedy available to the jeopardy-assessed taxpayer 
is refund litigation in a district court or the Court of  claim^.^' In 
order to bring a refund action, however, the taxpayer must first 
pay the full amount of the asse~sment ,~~  either by raising the cash 
from relatives, friends, or other lenders,73 or by authorizing the 
IRS to sell his seized assets and apply the proceeds to the 
asses~ment .~~  Once the tax has been paid, the taxpayer may file 
his claim for a refund with the S e r ~ i c e , ~ ~  but must wait six 
-- -- 
68. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, 0 0 273(a), 872Cj), 1013(j), 67 Stat. 583 (now INT. REV. 
CODE OF 1954, 0 6861(g)). 
69. Treas. Reg. P 301.6861-1(c) (1957). 
70. IRS procedures require that all jeopardy assessments be approved by the district 
director. CCH INT. REV. MANUAL 0 5213.21(6) (1974). 
71. The provisions governing taxpayer refund suits are found in INT. REV. CODE OF 
1954, 4 7422. 
72. Payment in full of the alleged tax liability, no matter how exaggerated it is later 
determined to have been, is ordinarily a jurisdictional prerequisite to refund litigation in 
a district court or the Court of Claims. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 passim (1960). 
There is apparently one exception to this well-established rule: 
If a taxpayer does not pay the full assessment for the terminated period, he may 
nevertheless sue for a refund provided he files returns for the terminated period 
and the full year. In this event, the returns open the terminated period and serve 
as an informal claim for a refund. 
Lewis v. Sandler, 498 F.2d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 1974), citing Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20, 24 
& n.6 (2d Cir. 1973). Because Irving relied on the notion that a deficiency did not exist 
under these circumstances, this exception may be called into question by the holding in 
Laing, that termination of a taxable year does in fact result in a deficiency. 
73. The taxpayer might be able to convince a third party to advance the cash needed 
to pay the assessment by giving the third party a security interest in the seized assets 
which the IRS would return upon payment of the assessment. 
74. The process of public sale by the IRS is likely, however, to take much longer and 
produce less cash than a private sale of the assets by the taxpayer. 
75. In the case of jeopardy assessment, the taxpayer can either make a formal claim 
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months thereafter to bring suit for the refund, unless the claim 
is denied ~ooner.~VI'hus, access to refund litigation is likely to 
require more delays than the jeopardy-assessed taxpayer, or his 
business, can stand.77 
Occasionally, the government's jeopardy assessment will 
exceed the value of the taxpayer's assets,78 or the Service will levy 
upon property which it is not obligated to credit against the tax- 
payer's tax liability.7g In these circumstances, the refund litiga- 
tion remedy is probably foreclosed to the taxpayer by the full 
payment requirement announced in Flora v. United States. 80 
4. "Prepayment" Tax Court redetermination 
After receipt of the statutory notice of deficiency, which may 
be as late as 60 days after a jeopardy assessment and seizure of 
property,R1 the taxpayer has 90 days to petition the Tax Court for 
a redetermination of his tax liability.82 Although he does not have 
to "pay'' the assessment to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tax 
Court, the Service will keep the taxpayer's property to secure 
payment of the jeopardy assessment until conclusion of the Tax 
Court proceeding, which may be as long as two years." Therefore, 
for refund on Form 843, or file an amended return(s) for the yearb) covered by the 
jeopardy assessment showing more tax paid than was due. A termination-assessed tax- 
payer may file a formal Form 843 claim, or as discussed in note 72 supra, he may simply 
file returns for the short period and the full year. 
76. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $4 6532(a), 7422(a). 
77. Where the taxpayer's business assets are seized and he is forced to suspend 
operations, the rapid loss of contracts, goodwill, etc. may render the business valueless 
by the time the taxpayer is vindicated in the courts. 
78. This approach is often used in narcotics-related seizures of property. Tarlow, 
Criminal Defendants and Abuse of Jeopardy Tax Procedures, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1191, 
1192 (1975). 
79. For example, the IRS may refuse to credit against the tax liability any property 
which is subject to forfeiture. Id. a t  1199 & n.70. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. $ 1177 (1970) 
(forfeiture of gambling devices); 49 U.S.C. 5 782 (1970) (forfeiture of carriers transporting 
contraband). 
80. 362 U.S. 145 (1960). For a limited exception to the Flora rule see note 72 supra. 
81. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $ 6861(b). Note that a termination-assessed taxpayer is 
now entitled to the statutory notice of a deficiency, or 90-day letter. See notes 35-40 and 
accompanying text supra. 
82. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 4 6213(a). 
83. Tarlow, Criminal Defendants and Abuse of Jeopardy Tax Procedures, 22 
1J.C.L.A. I,. REV. 1191, 1198 & n.62 (1975). 
Sale of the taxpayer's assets by the IRS is stayed throughout the Tax Court proceed- 
ing, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $6863(b)(3)(A), but unless the taxpayer posts a bond under 
9 6863(a) or 4 6851(e) (discussed in text accompanying notes 58-65 supra), the IRS is 
under no obligation to return his assets. 
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the delays involved in Tax Court litigation may also prove ruin- 
ous to the taxpayer. 
5. Possible non- Code remedies 
Because of the limited value of the remedies provided by the 
Code, taxpayers and their counsel have sought to devise addi- 
tional remedial measures for summary  assessment^.^^ One such 
remedy is an action to enjoin an improper jeopardy assessment. 
The availability of injunctive relief could reduce the expense and 
delay involved in the other approaches to judicial review. Section 
7421(a) of the Code, however, strictly prohibits suits to enjoin the 
collection of taxes.R5 Statutory exceptions to this rule are avail- 
able where (1) the Service does not send the required statutory 
notice of deficiency within 60 days," or (2) it is "apparent that, 
under the most liberal view of the law and the facts, the United 
States cannot establish its claim," and the taxpayer, having no 
adequate remedy a t  law, will be irreparably injured by the impro- 
per asse~sment.~' The first exception offers little comfort to the 
84. Two such remedies are discussed in Tarlow, Criminal Defendants and Abuse of 
Jeopardy Tax Procedures, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1191, 1200-08 (1975). In addition to the 
possibility of an action for injunctive relief, Tarlow suggests that a taxpayer who is quick 
enough might be able to overcome the problem of obtaining counsel by assigning his 
interest in seized funds to an attorney as compensation for legal services. The value of 
this remedy is limited, however, since the assignment wiIl take priority over the federal 
tax lien only if it is made prior to levy by the IRS on the taxpayer's property, and also 
because of the ethical limits on the amount of an assignment that the attorney can accept 
as compensation for services. Id. a t  1205-07 & n.5. 
85. The Code's anti-injunction provision states that "no suit for the purpose of re- 
straining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any 
person . . . ." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 4 7421(a). For a discussion of the few jeopardy and 
termination assessment cases giving favorable consideration to the possibility of injunc- 
tive relief see text accompanying notes 93-101 infra. 
86. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 8 6213(a) prohibits levy or other proceedings to collect 
the tax before notice [the 90-day letter] has been mailed to the taxpayer, during the 90- 
day period subsequent to notice, and during the pendency of any properly petitioned Tax 
Court proceeding. The section provides that: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421(a), the making of such assess- 
ment or the beginning of such proceeding or levy during the time such prohibi- 
tion is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court. 
87. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). The limited 
utility of the exception is described as follows: 
We believe that the question of whether the Government has a chance of ulti- 
mately prevailing is to be determined on the basis of the information available 
to it at  the time of suit. Only if it is then apparent that, under the most liberal 
view of the law and the facts, the United States cannot establish its claim, may 
the suit for an injunction be maintained. Otherwise, the District Court is with- 
out jurisdiction, and the complaint must be dismissed. To require more than 
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taxpayer, since the court may allow the IRS a short period follow- 
ing the court's ruling to send a deficiency notice before collection 
will actually be enjoined.8R Also, as discussed earlier, even if one 
summary assessment is enjoined, the IRS is not barred from mak- 
ing another.R9 To date, the second exception has only been avail- 
able to taxpayers in the most egregious of factual settings?O 
Perhaps due in part to the non-reviewability of the district 
director's jeopardy determination, the jeopardy and termination 
good faith on the part of the Government would unduly interfere with a collat- 
eral objective of the Act-protection of the collector from litigation pending a 
suit for refund. And to permit even the maintenance of a suit in which an 
injunction could issue only after the taxpayer's nonliability had been conclu- 
sively established might "in every practical sense operate to suspend collection 
of the . . . taxes until the litigation is ended." 
Id. a t  7-8. See also Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Alexander v. "Ameri- 
cans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974). 
In Comm'r v. Shapiro, 96 S. Ct. 1062 (1976), the Supreme Court made injunctive 
relief somewhat more accessible by holding that in such an action the IRS must disclose 
to the taxpayer the factual basis for the jeopardy assessment: 
Williams Packing did not hold that the taxpayer's burden of persuading the 
District Court that the Government will under no circumstances prevail must 
be accomplished without any disclosure of information by the Government. It 
says instead that the question will be resolved on the basis of the information 
available to the Government a t  the time of the suit. Since it is absolutely 
impossible to determine what information is available to the Government a t  the 
time of the suit, unless the Government discloses such information in the Dis- 
trict Court pursuant to appropriate procedures, i t  is obvious that the Court in 
Williams Packing intended some disclosure by the Government 
Id. a t  1071. The Court noted that such disclosure can be made through ordinary discovery 
procedures: 
The Government may defeat a claim by the taxpayer that its assessment has 
no basis in fact-and therefore render applicable the Anti-Injunction 
Act-without resort to oral testimony and cross-examination. Affidavits are 
sufficient so long as they disclose basic facts from which it appears that the 
Government may prevail. 
Id.  a t  1074. Following Shapiro, the IRS may no longer raise the Anti-Injunction Act 
defense by mere conclusory allegations of tax liability, in cases in which the taxpayer is 
able to meet the first test under Williams Packing (irreparable injury and lack of an 
adequate remedy a t  law). 
Lately, this exception has played an important role in dealing with the Service's 
"Narcotics Project." See notes 91-97 and accompanying text infra. 
88. See, e.g., McGee v. United States, 380 F. Supp. 801, 803 (N.D. Ind. 1974); Wil- 
liams v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 71 (D. Nev. 1973). 
89. Note 27 and accompanying text supra. 
90. See, e.g., Willits v. Richardson, 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974), discussed in text 
accompanying notes 91-97 infra; Sherman v. Nash, 488 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1973), discussed 
in text accompanying notes 98-101 infra. 
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assessment powers have been the subject of several kinds of 
abuse. The term "abuse" is used here to indicate circumstances 
in which possible jeopardy to the collection of the revenue was not 
the true impetus for the summary assessment, and in fact may 
not have been considered. 
A. The IRS "Narcotics Project" 
Since 1971, the Service has embarked on a new program, 
entitled the "Narcotics Project," to "disrupt the distribution of 
narcotics through the enforcement of all available tax statutes, 
specifically the termination assessment power.92 This project and 
its abuses may best be illustrated by the facts of Willits v. 
Richardson, 93 in which Sharon Willits sought injunctive relief 
against the IRS after seizure of her property. 
Because of Ms. Willits' prior association with a suspected 
narcotics dealer, she was stopped by two narcotics officers of the 
Miami Police Department on May 24, 1973, while driving a bor- 
rowed automobile. As a result of Ms. Willits' refusal to give her 
current address and because of irregularities in the car registra- 
tion (later found to be typographical errors), she was arrested for 
speeding, although she was taken to the narcotics section of the 
police station. While at the station and at  the request of the 
officers, Ms. Willits opened her purse, revealing a pistol. She was 
arrested for carrying a concealed weapon without a permit, and 
advised of her constitutional rights. Upon a further search of her 
purse, the officers found some pills later determined to be barbi- 
tuates, prescribed by her doctor. In addition to the pills, the 
officers found a gold coin, a small piece of jewelry, and an enve- 
lope containing initialed slips of paper and approximately 
$4,400.00 in cash. At the request of the police, Ms. Willits also 
91. One of the earliest references to the project appears in the 1971 COMM'R OF INT. 
REV. ANN. REP. 36, which states: 
Due to recent increases in narcotics trafficking, the President [Nixon] directed 
all Federal law enforcement agencies to cooperate in a program to combat traf- 
fickers and suppliers. The Treasury Department appointed a special task force 
to develop this program. The Intelligence and the Audit Divisions are now in 
the process of expanding their activity in this area. Efforts will be directed 
against middle and upper echelon distributors, wholesalers, and financiers in- 
volved in narcotics traffic for possible civil or criminal violations of the Internal 
Revenue Code. 
Id.  
92. Silver, Terminating the taxpayer's taxable year: How IRS uses it against narcot- 
ics suspects, 40 J .  TAXATION 110 (1974). 
93. 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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surrendered some diamond rings she was wearing. The plaintiff 
was then formally charged with possession of narcotics, unlaw- 
fully carrying a concealed weapon, and speeding. She was later 
released on a $2,000.00 bond. 
The following day, May 25, 1973, one of the arresting officers 
advised Mr. John Zahurak of the IRS of Ms. Willits' arrest and 
her association with suspected narcotics dealers. After discover- 
ing that Ms. Willits had not filed tax returns for any of the four 
preceeding years, Mr. Zahurak speculated that Ms. Willits had 
earned commissions of $60,000 on sales of $240,000 of cocaine for 
1973.94 Zahurak then recommended to his superiors that Ms. Wil- 
lits' tax year be terminated, that the tax due be demanded, and 
if necessary assessed, in the amount of $25,549. At 3:20 p.m. on 
May 25, 1973, a notice, advising Ms. Willits that her taxable year 
had been terminated and that a tax of $25,549 was due and paya- 
ble, was sent to her by certified mail. About the same time an 
assessment of equal amount was made against Ms. Willits. On 
May 30, 1973, the IRS served a notice of levy upon the Miami 
Police Department, and seized all of Ms. Willits' property then 
in the possession of the Department. 
On these facts, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held 
that an injunction was appropriate as no evidence existed to indi- 
cate that Ms. Willits had ever dealt in cocaine. The seizure of her 
property was based upon a police officer's speculation and the 
fictitious assessment by Mr. Zah~rak. '~  The court concluded that 
94. This computation was based upon the notations on one of the slips of paper found 
with the money, which supposedly represented one such drug transaction. Id. a t  245. 
95. Occasionally the estimates are so flimsy that the courts have granted injunctive 
relief. Several gambling cases provide good examples: Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 
565, 575 (5th Cir. 1973) (the IRS estimated gr%ss receipts for a betting season from one 
day's wagering slips); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 583-84 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969) (income over a five-year period was estimated from gambling 
receipts from three days, although the IRS could not establish that the taxpayer had 
operated as a gambler for five years or that the slips were typical of his income during 
that period); Rinieri v. Scanlon, 254 F. Supp. 469,474 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (the IRS presented 
no evidence that the taxpayer had even earned his money in the United States). 
The Fifth Circuit in Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 111 & n.5, 117 n.28 (5th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 366 (1975), noted that a summary assessment against Clark 
exceeded the amount seized a t  the time of his arrest, in conformance with a pattern of 
arbitrary assessments. In United States v. Rubio, 404 F.2d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 394 U.S. 993 (1969), $2,796 was seized from a narcotics suspect upon his arrest, 
his taxable year was terminated, and a deficiency equal to the exact amount of the 
seized funds was assessed. In Rinieri v. Scanlon, 254 F. Supp. 469, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), 
an IRS agent testified that he had been ordered "to write a report that would come out 
with an income tax of approximately $247,500 so that the government would have a basis 
[for] seizing" the taxpayer's money in that amount. See also Aguilar v. United States, 
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it could not allow this procedure to be used "as summary punish- 
ment to supplement or complement regular criminal proce- 
dures ."96 
Several other cases have condemned the clearly punitive, 
motive behind this use of the termination assessment as outside 
the power's statutory purpose of protecting the collection of the 
revenue.g7 To date, however, there has been no indication that the 
Service intends to discontinue its "Narcotics P ro je~ t . "~~ . '  
B. Cooperation with the Justice Department 
The facts of one recent case highlight the use of the Service 
and its summary assessment powers by other government agen- 
cies. In Sherman v. N a ~ h , ~ V h e  Justice Department had been 
investigating racketeering in New Jersey. When a key witness fled 
501 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1974); Willits v. Richardson, 497 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1974). 
96. 497 F.2d at  246. See Aguilar v. United States, 501 F.2d 127,130-31 (5th Cir. 1974). 
97. Finding that the IRS had acted in "evident excess of statutory authority," the 
court in United States v. Bonaguro, 294 F. Supp. 750, 753-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff 'd sub 
nom. United States v. Dono, 428 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970), 
concluded that the IRS 
had not acted under the statute to protect the revenue interest and collect a tax 
that seemed to be in jeopardy, but had made a merely colorable use of the 
statutory forms at  the suggestion of another agency of government in accordance 
with a pattern of conduct that is not strange to the courts. 
In Kabbaby u. Richardson, 520 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1975), the court stated: 
This case presents once again a pattern we have seen too often recently: arrest 
by local police, immediate notification of the IRS when drugs and a large 
amount of cash are found in the possession of the suspect, quick termination of 
the suspect's taxable year followed by a jeopardy assessment based on a totally 
insupportable extrapolation of taxes due from the drugs found, and seizure by 
the IRS of the cash and valuables then impounded at  the police station. This 
Court has deplored these tactics . . . . 
See Aguilar v. United States, 501 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1974); Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 
108 (5th Cir. 1974); Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1973). 
97.1. In a recent annual report, the IRS made the following comment on its "Narcot- 
ics Project" activities: 
In 1974, the Service began a reevaluation of its participation in investigations 
of organized crime figures and narcotics traffickers to ensure that its criminal 
enforcement efforts were directed a t  the most significant violators of the income 
tax laws. While the Service will continue to cooperate with other Federal agen- 
cies in the conduct of investigations of criminals who have violated the tax laws 
and maintain a strong drive to enforce the tax laws against criminals, its efforts 
in the future depend, of course, upon available resources. These resources must 
be used in an efficient manner that will have the maximum possible impact on 
all who engage in criminal violations of the tax laws. 
1974 COMM'R OF INT. REV. ANN. REP. 27. 
98. 488 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1973). 
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to the Bahamas to avoid testifyingYg9 the Justice Department al- 
legedly looked for a way to bring him back within the reach of 
service of process. The witness/taxpayer claimed that the solution 
eventually chosen was imposition of a jeopardy assessment and 
seizure of his property.loO When he returned to the United States 
to defend his property against the Internal Revenue Service ac- 
tion, the taxpayer was immediately subpoenaed to testify in the 
Justice Department proceeding. Although the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit disapproved the government's apparent 
total disregard for the power's statutory purpose of protecting the 
revenue and remanded the case for a determination of whether 
the alleged abuse took place,lOl such cooperation between govern- 
ment agencies will be difficult to eliminate except on a case-by- 
case basis. 
C. Tolling the Statute of Limitations 
Ordinarily, there is a three-year statute of limitations applic- 
able to the assessment and collection of taxedo2 Occasionally, 
however, the Service is unable to complete its audit within this 
statutory period, and hence is unable to state accurately the 
amount of the deficiency and the grounds for its assessment. 
Reluctant to limit the assessment to the amount then provable,lo3 
the Service has sometimes "bought" an additional 60 days to 
determine the actual amount of the deficiency by making a jeop- 
ardy assessment.lo4 Since the Code permits the jeopardy assess- 
ment to be in a different amount than the deficiency notice which 
is eventually sent,lo5 the Service is free to make maximum use of 
new information unearthed during the 60-day period before no- 
99. Id. a t  1083 n.5. 
100. Id. at 1083. 
101. Id. at 1085. 
102. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501(a). If the taxpayer fails to file a return, or willfully 
attempts to evade a tax, the tax may be assessed at any time. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $ 
6501(c)(2), (3). If a return omits more than 25 percent of property includible in gross 
income, the limitations period is six years. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 4 6501(e). 
103. The Service's reluctance to go to court prior to completion of the audit stems 
from the fact that the Tax Court has consistently placed the burden of proof on the Service 
whenever an additional deficiency is asserted. See, e.g., Estate of Harry Schneider, 29 
T.C. 940, 946 (1958); Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 10 T.C. 7, 13 (1948); Security First 
Nat'l Bank, 28 B.T.A. 289, 313 (1933). 
104. The Service gains 60 days in this manner, not because the jeopardy assessment 
will immediately stop the running of the statue of limitations, but because the statutory 
notice of deficiency, stating the amount of the alleged deficiency, need not be sent until 
60 days later. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 6861(b). 
105. Note 28 and accompanying text supra. 
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tice must be sent. This use of the jeopardy assessment power, 
though unrelated to the purpose underlying the summary assess- 
ment statutes,lQ6 has been upheld by the courts from a very early 
date,lQ7 apparently on the basis of two major premises: (1) the 
Service will seldom actually seize the taxpayer's property in cases 
in which "jeopardy" is not based on any acts of the taxpayer,lo8 
and (2) the courts generally regard statutes of limitations as mat- 
ters of legislative grace, and therefore, in thi.s instance, construe 
them strictly against the taxpayer.log Despite the courts' approval 
of this technique, as of the mid-1960's the Service claimed to have 
ceased the use of the jeopardy assessment power to suspend the 
statute of limitations.110 
D. Use For Leverage in Settlement Negotiations 
Because of its tremendous impact on the taxpayer, the threat 
of a summary assessment can be a powerful, if not unfair, bar- 
gaining tool in the hands of a revenue agent who reaches an 
impasse in settlement negotiations with a taxpayer. In one such 
case, the threat of a jeopardy assessment caused a group of eight 
taxpayers to deposit $1,000,000 with a district director to be ap- 
plied against a tax liability eventually stipulated by the Commis- 
sioner to be slightly more than $lOO,OOO.lll In the absence of judi- 
106. CCH INT. REV. MANUAL 4 5213.21(2) (1974) provides that, pursuant to IRS policy 
statement P-4-89, a jeopardy assessment may be recommended when one or more of the 
following conditions exist: 
(a) The taxpayer is or appears to be designing quickly to place his prop- 
erty beyond the reach of the Government either by removing it  from the United 
States, or by concealing it, or by transferring it to other persons, or by dissipat- 
ing it. 
(b) The taxpayer is, or appears to be designing quickly to depart from the 
United States, or to conceal himself. 
(c) The taxpayer's financial solvency is or appears to be imperiled. (This 
does not include cases where the taxpayer becomes insolvent by virtue of the 
accrual of the proposed assessment of tax, penalty and interest). 
107. Veeder v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 342, 343-44 (7th Cir. 1929); Foundation Co. v. 
United States, 15 F. Supp. 229, 246-48 (Ct. C1. 1936). 
108. Stranglehold, supra note 11, a t  721. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. a t  720 n.129. One provision of the ABA Section of Taxation's 1958 proposal 
to reform jeopardy assessment procedures would have specifically made imminent expira- 
tion of the statute of limitations an invalid basis for jeopardy. Id. a t  734-35 & n.212. 
111. Fortugno v. Commissioner, 353 F.2d 429, 433-35 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed, 
385 U.S. 954 (1966). Upon recovering the balance of $900,000, the taxpayers sought to 
recover interest on that amount for the period that it was held by the Service. Both the 
Tax Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied the claim for interest on the 
ground that the deposit was not an "overpayment in respect to any internal revenue tax" 
within the contemplation of INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, 4 3771(a). Id. a t  433-35. 
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cia1 review of the jeopardy determination, this subtle form of 
abuse is extremely difficult to police and is unlikely to disappear. 
E. Potential for Use as a Political Weapon 
The summary assessment powers present a particularly seri- 
ous threat to unpopular political groups. In 1956, for example, the 
jeopardy assessment power was used against the Communist 
Party112 and its newspaper, the Daily Worker.l13 These incidents 
point out the peculiar vulnerability of such organizations to the 
devastating effects of summary assessments. Most such groups 
operate on a marginal basis and are unable to weather the loss of 
contributions which naturally follows on the heels of a summary 
assessment.l14 At the same time, their questonable financial sta- 
bility could itself be used as the justification for a summary as- 
sessment. This extreme vulnerability could be exploited against 
the wide range of radical, dissident, and merely unorthodox 
groups which have heretofore enjoyed the beneficent protection 
of the Con~titution."~ 
The propensity of a recent President to order vigorous audits 
to harass his "political enemies"116 raises the specter of the use of 
summary assessment powers against individuals. If such "ene- 
mies" can be harmed by the use of the audit power, they might 
be completely immobilized, silenced, and ruined by abuse of the 
summary assessment powers. 
In 1966, although there were 104,077,987 returns filed,l17 
there were only 279 jeopardy assessments made covering 636 tax- 
able yearsnH8 Thus, the summary assessment powers are invoked 
112. Communist Party of the United States v. Moysey, 141 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 
1956). 
113. Publishers New Press, Inc. v. Moysey, 141 F. Supp. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
114. Where the summary assessment is large and the organization's total assets may 
not be enough to satisfy it, further receipts from contributors will be seized as they come 
in. Contributions dry up quickly when donars realize that their donations are likely to go 
directly into the United States Treasury to satisfy the assessment. In the normal assess- 
ment situation, on the other hand, they may rationalize that either someone else's dollars, 
or only a small portion of their own, are being used to pay the tax. 
115. Indeed, harsh enforcement of the tax laws against political groups may consti- 
tute a deprivation of their members' First Amendment rights. See Stranglehold, supra 
note 11, a t  733. 
116. Kuttner, The taxing trials of I.R.S., N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1974, 9 6 (Magazine), 
a t  8. 
117. 1966 COMM'R OF INT. REV. ANN. REP. 34. 
118. Stranglehold, supra note 11, at 717 n.113. 
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against only a tiny majority of American taxpayers. Nevertheless, 
because of the devastating effect of summary assessments on the 
affected taxpayers, the practice cannot be dismissed as insignifi- 
cant. Moreover, the continuing abuse of the powers indicates that  
present controls over their use are inadequate, and that addi- 
tional restraints are needed. 
In arriving a t  suitable control measures, it is necessary to 
achieve a balance between two important but opposing policy 
objectives: (1) the need to protect the revenue,llg and (2) the need 
to extend to taxpayers the due process protections provided in 
other contexts.12" 
At the outset, it should be noted that the first policy goal, 
protecting the revenue, has long been recognized as an important 
governmental objective121 and is not to be ignored. If taxpayers 
could freely evade payment of taxes by concealing their assets or 
leaving the country, the entire tax collection system would be 
threatened, and with i t  the continued functioning of our govern- 
ment. Hence, summary assessment powers in some form clearly 
have a place in our system of taxation. Yet the history of abuses 
suggests that protection of the revenue may have been given too 
much weight in the past, ignoring the need for due process protec- 
tions entirely. Since neither extreme is appropriate, some accom- 
modation of both policy objectives is called for. 
A. The Jeopardy Determination 
1 .  Problems of control 
Perhaps the most significant failing of the present summary 
assessment procedures is the general unavailability of review of 
the district director's original finding of j e 0 ~ a r d y . l ~ ~  One impor- 
tant reason cited by the courts for the unavailability of review is 
- - -  
119. See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U S .  589, 594-95 (1931). 
120. Notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra. 
121. See, e.g., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 US.  589, 594-95 (1931). 
122. The courts have generally held that the existence of jeopardy to the revenue is 
a determination solely within the discretion of the district director, and not subject to 
judicial review. Authorities cited note 55 supra. The only exceptions have been in 
Sherman, see notes 98-101 and accompanying text supra, in which the taxpayer was able 
to demonstrate that there had been no genuine finding of jeopardy at all, and several of 
the narcotics cases, see notes 95-97 supra, in which the courts found that the IRS estimates 
of tax liability were so reckless and lacking in factual basis as to constitute harrassment. 
Note, however, that the Supreme Court, in Comm 'r v. Shapiro, note 87 supra, has recently 
ruled that the IRS must now disclose to the taxpayer the factual basis for the jeopardy 
assessment. 
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the absence in the jeopardy assessment provision, and the inade- 
quacy in the termination provision,123 of objective standards 
against which to judge the district director's exercise of discre- 
tion.12' Thus, any plan to establish adequate controls over the 
exercise of the summary assessment powers must necessarily pro- 
vide for the creation of standards to guide the proper exercise of 
those powers. The following proposal is one approach to achieving 
objective standards while preserving needed fle~ibi1ity.l~~ 
2. Proposal for creation of standards 
First, the summary assessment provisions in the Code itself 
should be drawn more narrowly, to delineate the kinds of circum- 
stances which justify the use of summary assessment powers. The 
present termination assessment provision126 describes two specific 
situations which mandate the termination of a taxable year, but 
concludes with a third guideline broad enough to open the door 
to the kinds of abuses discussed earlier.ln The jeopardy assess- 
ment provision offers no such guidelines a t  all. In addition to 
specifying the conditions which trigger IRS application of the 
summary assessment provisions, Congress should require the dis- 
trict director to have "probable cause" to believe that those con- 
ditions exist,128 rather than the mere unsubstantiated "belief' 
123. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, Q 6851(a)(l) (termination assessments) contains stan- 
dards for determining jeopardy, but no court has yet applied them to restrain the IRS: 
If the Secretary or his delegate finds that a taxpayer designs quickly to 
depart from the United States or to remove his property therefrom, or to conceal 
himself or his property therein, or to do any other act tending to prejudice or to 
render wholly or partly ineffectual proceedings to collect the income tax for the 
current or the preceeding taxable year unless such proceedings be brought with- 
out delay. . . . 
124. See, e.g . ,  Veeder v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 342, 345 (7th Cir. 1929), in which the 
court stated that review was precluded partly because of the "absence of statutory stan- 
dards by which any reviewing body may test the correctness of the belief of the Commis- 
sioner. " 
125. Arguments could be made in support of Congress, the judiciary, or the IRS itself 
promulgating standards. The most practical solution, however, appears to be the one 
suggested here: a combination of all three, with each of these bodies assuming a distinct 
role of its own. 
126. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 9 6851. 
127. This broad guideline allows a termination assessment to be made whenever a 
taxpayer does "any other act tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partially inefffec- 
tual proceedings to collect the income tax . . . ." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $ 6851(a)(1) 
set forth in note 123 supra. Contra, Gustafson, Judicial Review of Jeopardy Tax Collec- 
tion: Sentence First, Verdict Afterwards, 26 CASE W .  RES. L. REV. 315, 364 (1976). 
128. Mr. Justice Brennan recently suggested the probable cause standard for jeop- 
ardy determinations in his concurring opinion in Laing v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 473, 
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that is presently required. 
Second, the Code provisions should include a requirement 
that the IRS promulgate specific standards or guidelines further 
circumscribing the application of the summary assessment pow- 
ers. The present Treasury Regulations governing summary as- 
sessmentslZg are largely a restatement, sometimes in even broader 
terms, of the Code provisions. 
The availability of specific standards would make two kinds 
of judicial review of summary assessments possible. First, the 
judiciary could, given an appropriate challenge, examine the reg- 
ulations promulgated by the IRS to determine whether their 
terms were in harmony with the scope and intent of the Code 
provisions enacted by Congress. Second, under the A ccardi doc- 
trine that a governmental agency must carefully observe its own 
rules,130 the facts of the particular case could be examined to 
ascertain whether there had been actual compliance with the 
published regulations. 131 
Only if precise standards are developed as suggested here, 
will procedural changes to permit judicial review of the jeopardy 
determination have any real meaning. 
B. Procedural Reforms 
With adequate standards to guide the jeopardy determina- 
tion, two approaches to judicial intervention in the summary as- 
sessment process are possible: the courts could review the jeop- 
ardy determination prior to levy and seizure, or alternatively, 
487 (1976). Deriving the standard from North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 
U.S. 601, 607 (1975), a prejudgment garnishment case, Mr. Justice Brennan stated that 
"the governing due process principle obliges IRS to provide a prompt hearing a t  which 
IRS must prove 'at least probable cause' for its claim." The Court referred to the "prob- 
able cause" standard in the jeopardy assessment context again, even more recently, in 
Comm'r v. Shapiro, 96 S. Ct. 1062, 1074 (1976). 
129. Treas. Reg. $ 4  1.6851-1 to 301.6863-2. The sole exceptions are the regulations 
governing termination of taxable years of departing aliens. Treas. Reg. $ 1.6851-2, T.D. 
6620, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 347. 
130. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 
131. This doctrine has recently been applied to the IRS in the area of tax fraud 
investigations. In both criminal and civil fraud cases, evidence has been excluded because 
it was not obtained in complaince with an IRS press release which stated that all special 
agents would give taxpayers under investigation a Miranda-type warning at the time of 
their first meeting. United States v. Sourapas, 515 F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir. 1975); United 
States v. Leahey, 434 F.2d 7 passim (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 
809, 811-12 (4th Cir. 1969). See also Romanelli v. Commissioner, 466 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 
1972); Comment, Miranda and the IRS: Protecting the Taxpayer by Administrative Due 
Process, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 751 (1975). 
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provide a post-seizure review of the district director's finding of 
jeopardy. 
1. Pre-seizure relief 
a.  Prior hearing. Conceivably, the summary assessment 
and collection steps could be separated. The district director 
could first make the assessment, notify the taxpayer of the de- 
ficiency, and demand payment. Then, only after a judicial hear- 
ing in which the taxpayer could challenge the jeopardy deter- 
mination, could the Service proceed to seize the taxpayer's prop- 
erty in satisfaction of the assessment. This approach would af- 
ford full due process protection to the taxpayer, yet no matter 
how quickly the Service was able to obtain judicial authorization 
to collect, the prior notice to the taxpayer would often enable him 
to conceal his assets or flee the country before collection. Thus, 
by overemphasizing the due process policy objective, the prior 
hearing solution is no better balanced than the present system 
under the Code. 
b. Ex parte afidavit procedure. To avoid the self-defeating 
aspects of prior notice to the taxpayer, the IRS could be required 
to obtain a judicial determination of jeopardy on an ex parte 
basis. This procedure would be similar to the requirement that a 
police officer demonstrate to the satisfaction of a magistrate the 
existence of probable cause to issue an arrest or search warrant. 
Some precedent for the use of this approach prior to the seizure 
of a debtor's assets may be found in the Louisiana sequestration 
statute' recently upheld by the Supreme Court in Mitchell v.  
W. T.  Grant Co.lS2 There, a writ of sequestration was available 
upon a creditor's verified affidavit before a neutral judicial 
officer? Application of such an ex parte approach in the sum- 
mary assessment area would allow the IRS to protect the revenue, 
yet reduce the likelihood of the abuses that have resulted from 
the exercise of unfettered discretion by the district director. 
2. Post-seizure review 
a. Immediate post-seizure hearing. If, in the interest of 
132. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). 
133. The Court in Mitchell noted that the determinative facts in the judge's decision 
on whether or not to issue the writ of sequestration, thereby allowing seizure of the 
property involved, are "ordinarily uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to docu- 
mentary proof." Id. at 609. Although the jeopardy determination may require more elabo- 
rate proof and the formal presentation of evidence, this could also be accomplished in an 
ex parte hearing. 
2331 IRS SUMMARY ASSESSMENT POWERS 259 
protecting the revenue, the taxpayer cannot be provided an op- 
portunity to participate in a hearing prior to seizure of his prop- 
erty, an immediate post-seizure hearing would afford substantial 
due process protection without jeopardizing collection of the reve- 
nue. In Mitchell, the Supreme Court upheld a creditor's seizure 
of a debtor's property without prior notice or hearing, where the 
applicable statute provided that the debtor could obtain an im- 
mediate post-seizure hearing. At the hearing, the judge was em- 
powered to order return of the debtor's property and assess dam- 
ages unless the creditor could prove the grounds for the seizure.ls4 
A similar procedure could be adopted in the summary assessment 
area by permitting the taxpayer to obtain an immediate post- 
seizure hearing, solely on the issue of jeopardy, in the nearest 
district court.135 If no jeopardy to the collection of the revenue 
existed, the court would invalidate the assessment and return the 
taxpayer's property. If the court sustained the IRS jeopardy de- 
termination, the taxpayer could still resort to Tax Court or refund 
litigation to dispute the amount of his tax liability. 
b. Equitable relief. At present, suits for either injunctive or 
declaratory relief are statutorily prohibited.13' Although, as pre- 
viously discussed, a few exceptions to the anti-injunction provi- 
sion have emerged in the summary assessment area,13' those cases 
generally involve the most compelling of circumstances and are 
of no use to most summary-assessed taxpayers. 
Equitable relief for summary-assessed taxpayers was pro- 
posed in 1958 by the American Bar Association Section of 
T a ~ a t i 0 n . l ~ ~  Under the A.B.A. proposal, the taxpayer could chal- 
lenge the jeopardy determination in an expedited action for dec- 
laratory judgment.'" If the district court ruled in the taxpayer's 
favor, it would vacate and annul the jeopardy assessment.140 Even 
134. Id. a t  606. 
135. A similar approach was included in the 1958 ABA proposal for declaratory relief. 
Notes 138-39 and accompanying text infra. 
136. Suits to enjoin the collection of any tax are barred by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 4 
7421, while 28 U.S.C. 4 2201 (1970) prohibits delcaratory judgement actions in respect of 
any tax. 
137. Notes 91-101 and accompanying text supra. 
138. Discussed in Stranglehold, supra note 11, a t  733-35. The proposal was intro- 
duced in the House of Representatives in 1965 as H.R. 11450,89th Cong., 1st Sess. $8 87- 
88 (1965). 
139. Any action pursuant to the proposed provision would have been "entitled to a 
preference on the calendar pursuant to the rules of the district court having jurisdiction 
of the proceeding." H.R. 11450, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 88 (1965). 
140. The proposed section read, in pertinent part: 
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if the district director's jeopardy determination were sustained, 
the district court would be empowered to release some of the 
taxpayer's property to him for certain enumerated purposes.141 
The A.B.A. proposal recognizes that the normal bars to suit 
against the Commissioner for declaratory or injunctive relief,142 
ordinarily necessary to ensure the orderly collection of the reve- 
nue, must be abolished in the extraordinary case of summary 
assessment and collection. The reasonableness of this exception 
is suggested first by the miniscule number of taxpayers in- 
~ o l v e d , ' ~ ~  and second by the fact that the Service, having already 
seized the taxpayer's property, holds the upper hand. Although 
introduced in Congress in 1965, the A.B.A.'s proposed amend- 
ments to the Code have never been enacted. 
IV. THE 1975 SUMMARY ASSESSMENT REFORM BILL 
In the fall of 1975, following a study of summary assessment 
procedures by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxa- 
tion,'" the House Ways and Means Committee concluded that 
because of the sudden and harsh effects of the summary proce- 
dures, 
a taxpayer should be able to obtain judicial review of the pro- 
priety of a jeopardy assessment or a termination of a taxable 
year on an expedited basis and also that assets levied on by 
reason of any jeopardy assessment or termination of a taxable 
Upon such review, if the court decides that the taxpayer has, by a fair prepon- 
derance of the evidence, proved that the assessment or collection of the defi- 
ciency will not be jeopardized by delay, the court shall vacate and annul the 
assessment . . . and it shall be void and of no effect. 
Id. 
141. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 6861 would have been amended under the proposal to 
permit the court to release sufficient assets to enable the taxpayer: 
(1) to retain the services of legal counsel and to provide for other necessary 
expenses in the representation of the taxpayer in all matters, civil, criminal, or 
both, relating to or affecting the tax liability asserted in the jeopardy assess- 
ment; (2) to repair, maintain and preserve property . . . (3) to pay taxes (except 
taxes covered by the jeopardy assessment) owing by the taxpayer whether due 
before or after the making of said jeopardy assessment. 
H.R. 11450, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 87 (1965). 
142. Note 136 supra. 
143. Text accompanying notes 117-18 supra. 
144. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, COMM. ON WAYS AND 
MEANS, 94TH CONG.,  ST SESS., JEOPARDY AND ~ R M I N A T I O N  ASSESSMENTS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
SUMMONS, COMPREHENSEIVE ADMINISTRATIVE PACKAGE, STATE CONDUCTED LOTTERIES, AND 
MISCELLANEOUS (Comm. Print 1975). 
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year should not be sold prior to or during the pendency of this 
judicial review. 
The Ways and Means Committee therefore reported out, as part 
of the Tax Reform Bill of 1975,1d6 a provision which would provide 
a significant additional remedy for jeopardy and termination 
assessed taxpayers.ld7 
A. New Procedure for Expedited Tax Court Review 
The proposed amendment to the present summary assess- 
ment statutes would add a section 6866 to the Code,148 thereby 
145. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., REPORT ON THE TAX REFORM BILL OF 1975, H.R. 
REP. NO. 658,94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); also reported in 62 CCH 1975 STAND. FED. TAX 
REP., Special No. 4, Part 2 at 303 (No. 53, Nov. 15, 1975). 
146. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 106121 was 
reported out of the House Ways and Means Committee on November 12, 1975. H.R. REP. 
No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
147. H.R. 10612 $ 1209(a); see note 148 infra. The present version of the Act has an 
effective date of December 31, 1975. H.R. 10612 § 1209(d). Since this date has passed 
without enactment of the bill, a new effective date will be necessary for a final version of 
the Act. 
148. H.R. 10612 § 1209(a) reads as follows: 
(a) REVIEW OF JEOPARDY AND TERMINATION ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES BY TAX 
COURT-Subchapter A of chapter 70 (relating to jeopardy) is amended by adding 
at  the end thereof the following new part: 
"PART 111-REVIEW OF TERMINATION OF TAXABLE PERIOD AND 
JEOPARDY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES BY TAX COURT 
"Sec. 6866. REVIEW BY TAX COURT. 
"(a) FILING OF P ~ ~ 1 ~ 1 0 ~ . - W i t h i n  30 days after the day on which there is 
notice and demand for payment under section 6861(a) or 6862(a) or notice of 
termination of a taxable period under section 6851(a), the taxpayer may file a 
petititon with the Tax Court for a determination under this section. 
"(b) DETERMINATION BY TAX COURT.-Within 20 days after a petition is 
filed under subsection (a) with the Tax Court, the Tax Court shall determine 
whether or not- 
"(1) there was reasonable cause for making the assessment 
under section 6861 or 6862 or declaring the termination of the taxable 
period under section 6851, as the case may be, 
"(2) the amount so assessed or demanded was appropriate 
under the circumstances, and 
"(3) There is reasonable cause for rescinding (in whole or in 
part) the action taken under section 6861, 6862, or 6851, as the case 
may be. 
"(c) EXTENSION OF 20-DAY PERIOD WHERE TAXPAYER SO REQUESTS.-If the 
taxpayer requests an extension of the 20-day period set forth in subsection (b) 
and establishes reasonable grounds why such extension should be granted, the 
Tax Court may grant an extension of not more than 40 additional days. 
"(d) COMPUTATION F DAYS.-For purposes of this section, Saturday, Sun- 
day, or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia shall not be counted as the 
last day of any period. 
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providing a new procedure for expedited review of the district 
director's jeopardy determination. Within 30 days following infor- 
mal notice of either a jeopardy assessment or a termination as- 
sessment, the taxpayer could petition the Tax Court for review.149 
Further, the new provision would require the Tax Court to deter- 
mine the validity of the district director's jeopardy determination 
within 20 days after the petition had been filed.lsO 
The expedited review provided under the proposed Code sec- 
tion would not constitute, nor replace, the present formal Tax 
Court redetermination of tax liability.lsl The new expedited re- 
view in the Tax Court would be limited to determining the rea- 
sonableness of (1) making the summary assessment in the first 
place, and (2) the amount of the summary assessment.ls2 First, 
by requiring the Tax Court to "determine whether or not . . . 
there was reasonable cause for making the [jeopardy] assess- 
ment . . . or declaring the termination of the taxable period,"ls3 
the amendment would for the first time allow a taxpayer to force 
the IRS to justify its decision to make a summary assessment. 
Second, proposed section 6866 would authorize the Tax Court to 
determine whether the amount of the summary assessment was 
"appropriate under the  circumstance^."^^^ This would not entail 
an inquiry into the true tax liability, but would involve a judicial 
determination of whether, given only the facts available to the 
IRS a t  the time of the assessment, the assessment and underlying 
"(e) COMMISSONERS.-T~~ chief judge of the Tax Court may assign pro- 
ceedings under this section to be heard by the commissioners or the court, and 
the court may authorize a commissioner to make the determination of the court 
with respect to such proceeding, subject to such conditions and review as the 
court may by rule provide. 
"(f) FINALITY OF DETERMINATION.-A~~ determination made by the Tax 
Court under this section shall be final and conclusive and shall not be reviewed 
in any other court." 
149. Proposed 5 6866(a), note 148 supra. 
150. Proposed 5 6866(b), note 148 supra. 
151. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., REPORT ON THE TAX REFORM BILL OF 1975, H.R. 
REP. NO. 658, 9 4 ~ ~  CONG., ST SESS. (1975), also reported in 62 CCH 1975 STAND. FED. 
TAX REP., Special No. 4, Part 2 a t  304 (No. 53, Nov. 15, 1975), states: 
A determination made under new section 6866 will have no effect upon the 
determination of the correct tax liability in a subsequent proceeding. The pro- 
ceeding under the new provision is to be a separate proceeding which is unre- 
lated, substantively and procedurally, to any subsequent proceeding to deter- 
mine the correct tax liability, either by action for refund in a Federal district 
court or the Court of Claims or by a proceeding in the Tax Court. 
152. Proposed 5 6866(b)(l) & (2), note 148 supra. 
153. Proposed 5 6866(b) & (b)(l) ,  note 148 supra. 
154. Proposed 5 6866(b)(2), note 148 supra: 
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estimate of income were reasonable.ls5 If, on the basis of this 
limited review, the Tax Court found that the summary assess- 
ment was unjustified or excessive, it would be empowered to res- 
cind the assessment in whole or in p a r P 6  
The new provision expressly bars sale of the taxpayer's seized 
property until the day after the expedited Tax Court review of the 
jeopardy determination, or if no petition is filed, the day following 
the end of the 30-day filing period.ls7 This new language is proba- 
bly unnecessary, however, since under the present system sale is 
normally stayed at  least through the end of the 90-day filing 
period following issuance of the statutory notice of deficiency.ls8 
Another section of the Tax Reform Bill of 1975, applicable to all 
assessments including summary assessments, would exempt a 
minimal portion of the taxpayer's wages or salary from IRS levy 
and distraint procedures.lsg This expansion of the taxpayer's ex- 
155. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., REPORT ON THE TAX REFORM BILL OF 1975, H.R. 
REP. NO. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); also reported in 62 CCH 1975 STAND. FED. TAX 
REP., Special No. 4, Part 2 a t  304 (No. 53, Nov. 15, 1975), states: 
In determining whether the amount assessed was appropriate under the 
circumstances, the Tax Court is not expected to attempt to determine ultimate 
tax liability. Rather, the issue to be determined is whether, based on the infor- 
mation then available to the Internal Revenue Service, the amount of the assess- 
ment is reasonable. Thus, for example, in the absence of other evidence made 
available to the Internal Revenue Service before the hearing, an estimate of the 
taxpayer's liability to date based on information in fact available to the Internal 
Revenue Service will be presumed to  be reasonable. 
156. Proposed § 6866(b)(3), note 148 supra. 
157. H.R. 10612, § 1209(c) provides: 
(c) STAY OF SALE OF SEIZED PROPERTY PENDING TAX COURT DETERMINATION 
UNDER SECTION 6866.-Section 6863 (relating to stay of collecton of jeopardy 
assessments) is amended by adding a t  the end thereof the following new subsec- 
tion: 
"(c) STAY OF SALE OF SEIZED PROPERTY PENDING TAX COURT DETERMINATION 
UNDER SECTION 6866.- 
"(1) GENERAL RULE.-Where a jeopardy assessment has been made under 
section 6861(a) or 6862(a), or a taxable period has been terminated under section 
6851(a), the property seized for the collection of the tax shall not be sold- 
"(A) if a petition is filed in accordance with section 6866(a), 
before the day after the day on which the Tax Court makes its deter- 
mination in the proceeding, or 
"(B) if subparagraph (A) does not apply, before the day after 
the expiration of the period provided in section 6866 for filing the 
petition with the Tax Court. 
"(2) Exc~mo~s . -Wi th  respect to any property described in paragraph 
(I),  the exceptions provided by clauses (i) and (iii) of subsection (b)(3)(B) shall 
apply." 
158. See note 30 supra. 
159. H.R. 10612, § 1210, provides in part: 
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(a) GENERAL RULE.-Subsection (a) of section 6334 (relating to property exempt 
from levy) is amended by adding at  the end thereof the following new paragraph: 
"(9) MINIMUM EXEMPTION FOR WAGES, ALARY, AND OTHER INCOME.-A~Y amount 
payable to or received by an individual as wages or salary for personal services, or as 
income derived from other sources, during any period, to the extent that the total of 
such amounts payable to or received by him during such period does not exceed the 
applicable exempt amount determined under subsection (d)." 
(b) DETERMINATION OF EXEMPT AMOUNT.-Section 6334 is amended by adding at the 
end thereof the following new subsection: 
"(d) EXEMPT AMOUNT OF WAGES, SALARY, OR OTHER INCOME.- 
"(1) INDIVIDUALS ON WEEKLY BASIS.-In the case of an individual who is paid or 
receives all of his wages, salary, and other income on a weekly basis, the amount of 
the wages, salary, and other income payable to or received by him during any week 
which is exempt from levy under subsection (a)(9) shall be- 
"(A) $50, plus 
"(B) $15 for each individual who is specified in a written statement which 
is submitted to the person on whom notice of levy is served a ~ d  which is verified 
in such manner as the Secretary shall prescribe by regulations and- 
"(i) over half of whose support for the payroll period was received 
from the taxpayer, 
"(ii) who is the spouse of the taxpayer, or who bears a relationship 
to the taxpayer specified in paragraphs (1) through (9) of section 152(a) 
(relating to definition of dependents), and 
"(iii) who is not a minor child of the taxpayer with respect to whom 
amounts are exempt from levy under subsection (a)(8) for the payroll pe- 
riod. 
For purposes of subparagraph (B) (ii) of the preceding sentence, 'payroll period" shall 
be substituted for 'taxable year' each place it appears in paragraph (9) of section 
152(a). 
"(2) INDIVIDUALS ON BASIS OTHER THAN WEEKLY.-111 the case of any individual 
not described in paragraph (I), the amount of the wages, salary, and other income 
payable to or received by him during any applicable pay period or other fiscal period 
(as determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary) which is exempt from 
levy under subsection (a)(9) shall be an amount (determined under such regulations) 
which as nearly as possible will result in the same total exemption from levy for such 
individual over a period of time as he would have under paragraph (1) if (during such 
period of time) he were paid or received such wages, salary, and other income on a 
regular weekly basis." 
. . . .  
(d) LEVY ON WAGES, ETC., TO BE CONTINUING.- 
(1) Subsection (d) of section 6331 (relating to levy on salaries and wages) is 
amended by adding a t  the end thereof the following new paragraph: 
"(3) CONTINUING LEVY ON SALARY AND WAGES.- 
"(A) EFFECT OF LEVY.-The effect of a levy on salary or wages payable to 
or received by a taxpayer shall be continuous from the date such levy is first 
made until the liability out of which such levy arose is satisfied or becomes 
unenforceable by reason of lapse of time. 
"(B) RELEASE AND NOTICE OF RELEASE.-W~~~ respect to a levy described in 
subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall promptly release the levy when the liabil- 
ity out of which such levy arose is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason 
of lapse of time, and shall promptly notify the person upon whom such levy was 
made that such levy has been released." 
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emptions does little, however, to improve the woefully inadequate 
existing exemptions from levy. lfi0 
Finally, proposed section 6866 would allow the chief judge of 
the Tax Court to delegate the determination of cases under the 
section to commissioners of the court, subject to such conditions 
and review as the court may provide.'" The Tax Court's official 
ruling on any such case, however, "shall be final and conclusive 
and shall not be reviewed in any other court."Ifi2 
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of Proposed Section 6866 
The proposed amendment provides for post-seizure judicial 
review of the district director's jeopardy determination. As dis- 
cussed earlier, this approach is superior to a pre-seizure notice- 
type hearing in giving force to the general policy of protecting the 
revenue.'" At the same time, the new section would introduce a 
greater degree of due process protection into the summary assess- 
ment procedures by specifically providing for judicial inquiry into 
the reasonableness of the district director's finding of jeopardy. 
In addition, by expediting the process of review, the provision 
would significantly reduce the detriment to the taxpayer result- 
ing from seizure of his assets prior to his day in court. klthough 
the taxpayer's filing period to obtain the limited Tax Court re- 
view is reduced from the normal 90 days1" to only 3O,Ifi5 the tax- 
payer is not required to wait for the statutory notice of deficiency 
to obtain the limited review authorized by the proposed section. 
By promptly filing, the taxpayer could obtain a decision on the 
merits of the jeopardy determination in three weeks or less.lfi6 
On the other hand, the proposed section is deficient in a 
number of respects. Most significantly, the amendment still pro- 
vides no standards for the jeopardy determination. The House 
Ways and Means Committee report on the bill suggests that this 
omission was intentional: 
160. See note 10 supra which sets forth the present exemptions from levy. 
161. Proposed § 6866(e), note 148 supra. 
162. Proposed § 6866(f), note 148 supra. This provision is plainly intended to serve 
the same general purpose as the 4 7421 anti-injunction statute: preventing interference 
with the orderly collection of the revenue. Proposed § 6866(f) would accomplish this 
purpose by foreclosing the possibility of protracted court appeals. 
163. Section 111, B, 1, a supra. 
164. Notes 5-8 and accompanying text supra. 
165. Proposed § 6866(a), note 148 supra. 
166. Proposed § 6866(b), note 148 supra. 
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The committee believes that the general standards set forth 
in the Internal Revenue Manual relating to the conditions which 
must exist before a jeopardy or termination assessment is made 
are reas0nab1e.I~~ 
The Ways and Means Committee report seems to confer a qreater 
dignity on the internal guidelines provided to IRS agents than 
they have heretofore enjoyed. Indeed, the courts have simply ig- 
nored their existence in declaring that no judicial review of the 
jeopardy determination is available because no standards exist.lB8 
Even if the Internal Revenue Manual does contain adequate 
standards on which to base judicial review of the jeopardy deter- 
mination, this approach still involves serious problems. First, 
absent congressional restrictions in the Code, the IRS can freely 
alter these standards to suit its current needs without regard to 
whether the altered guidelines ultimately serve the purposes in- 
tended by Congress. Second, there is some doubt that, under the 
current case law, the IRS can even be compelled to follow these 
unpublicized internal guidelines, since the cases applying the 
Accardi doctrine to the tax area involved an IRS rule which was 
widely publicized in a press release.lBg In any event, although the 
new provision will provide for judicial scrutiny of the jeopardy 
determination, judicial interpretation of the standards set in the 
Internal Revenue Manual may still give the Service rather broad 
discretion. 
Another deficiency in the proposed amendment is the con- 
tinuing lack of any requirement that the taxpayer be informed of 
his right to seek redress. The taxpayer's need to be so informed 
is particularly acute under the proposed amendment since his 
right to an expedited review will expire if not exercised within 30 
days.170 TO correct this deficiency, the informal notice which trig- 
gers the running of the 30-day filing period171 should inform the 
taxpayer of (1) his right to obtain limited Tax Court review, (2) 
the means by which he may petition the Tax Court, and (3) the 
fact that he has only 30 days in which to act.lT2 In some cases, 
167. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., REPORT ON THE TAX REFORM BILL OF 1975, H.R. 
REP. NO. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); also reported in 62 CCH 1975 STAND. FED. TAX 
REP., Special No. 4, Part 2 at 304 (No. 53, Nov. 15, 1975). 
168. Note 124 supra. 
169. Notes 130-31 and accompanying text supra. 
170. Proposed 5 6866(a), note 148 supra. 
171. Id. 
172. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 602 (1974), the Supreme Court 
sustained the lower courts' requirement that the writ of sequestration served upon the 
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failure to provide such notice might effectively deprive a taxpayer 
of the proposed remedy. 
The merits of alternative measures ( e .g . ,  a pre-seizure ex 
parte probable-cause-type hearing) have already been exp10red.l~~ 
The fact that the proposed amendment does not adopt every 
possible taxpayer protection should not obscure the fact that it 
does provide for judicial intervention in the jeopardy determina- 
tion process. While any summary assessment, particularly a 
wrongful one, places an onerous burden on the taxpayer no mat- 
ter how short its duration, Tax Court review of the reasonableness 
of the summary assessment would place a significant limitation 
on the heretofore largely unfettered discretion of the IRS. 
The summary assessment powers are a powerful tool, and 
potential weapon, in the hands of the Internal Revenue Service. 
To date, the policy of protecting the revenue has completely over- 
ridden ordinary notions of due process in the use of these proce- 
dures. Consequently, there is an urgent need for immediate and 
fundamental reform of the summary assessment powers. The pro- 
posal currently before Congress will go a long way toward creating 
the proper balance between protection for the revenue and due 
process protection for the taxpayer. Although the original A.B.A. 
proposal to reform the jeopardy assessment procedure did not 
become law, hopefully the 1975 bill, covering all types of sum- 
mary assessments, will receive more favorable consideration in 
C ~ n g r e s s . ' ~ ~  
debtor be accompanied by notice of his right to seek dissolution of the writ and of the fact 
that he must "file a pleading or make appearance in the First City Court of the city of 
New Orleans within five days." 
173. See section 111, B, 1, b supra. 
174. On December 4, 1975, H.R. 10612 was passed by the House of Representatives 
with a few amendments not pertinent here, and on December 5, 1975, was referred to the 
Senate Finance Committee. Hearings were held in the Senate on December 9, 1975. As of 
March 24, 1976, no further action had been taken. 2 CCH CONG. INDEX 5098 (94th Cong. 
1975-76). 
